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Conceptions of Humor: Lakota 
(Sioux), Koestlerian, and 
Computational 
Benjamin Grant Purzycki 
Abstract: The Lakota (Sioux) sacred clowns (heyoka) of traditional 
religious practice offer a glimpse of the clown phenomenon found in 
many of the world's indigenous traditions. By illustrating the unified 
Lakota and Western conceptions of humor, the logic of how particular 
entities of the natural environment are understood as relatives 
according to Lakota thought is brought to light in hopes of introducing 
the idea that such insights were not only statements or observations 
about the external, physical world, but also about the internal or 
mental world. 
Introduction and Prefatory Remarks 
Any investigation into any non-Western social paradigm (or 
"culture") will be fraught with difficulties if the investigator is too 
hasty by immediately "fragmenting" the body of knowledge held under 
scrutiny according to his or her own intellectual tradition's dicta 
(Battiste & Youngblood Henderson 2000; Deloria Jr. 1979; Gayton this 
volume). It is part of this author's intention to attempt to understand 
and convey one related sliver of a particular tradition of the Plains. It 
should be understood that this glimpse is vastly incomplete and truly 
lies within a much broader context and network of Lakota thought. A 
result of this tendency, relegating or equating a specific population's 
thought to the category of religion is not accurate if the tradition under 
scrutiny does not separate the two. 
Moreover, it would be erroneous to claim that the following 
investigation probes "religion", rather, if anything, it is an examination 
of a portion of a culture as it is a way in which a people view a number 
of phenomena (hence "thought"). The Lakota (Sioux) tradition does 
not, nor does their lexicon reflect such a qualitative distinction between 
"religion", "thought", or "social paradigm". Take, for instance, the 
observation that the nature of the experience of humor (i.e. laughter) 
resembles lightning is not a "religious" observation, per se. Rather, it is 
and can be understood in a completely secular manner. In one sense, 
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then, it is the author's intentions to elevate-at the very least-this 
small portion of Lakota thought to one of philosophy, rather than 
religious, as its complexity and subtleties merits philosophical scrutiny, 
rather than any investment of faith. The problem inherent in doing this, 
of course, is the fact that some may not find what more or less amounts 
to a secularization of a particular tradition entirely appropriate either. 
While laughter is seen as sacred among the Lakota, it is my intention to 
make observations and report them, rather than make claims without 
the qualification or aptitude of what determining what precisely 
"sacred" is. Moreover, by elevating "religion" to the status of 
philosophy, it makes it available to serious, critical analysis. 
The following discussion, then, is an attempt to look at one 
particular cluster of concepts and their relationships, which is discussed 
by both Lakota and Koestler in surprisingly similar terms followed by a 
brief sketch of what a computational theory of humor might look like 
based on this unified starting point. While "culture" and "humor" are 
equally elusive, there are differences. The problem with talking about 
"culture" is that while it is difficult to pin down precisely what it is, 
whatever one says will probably be at least a little correct because it is 
so big. The problem with talking about humor is that it is so small. 
"Social paradigm" is preferred as the discussion is primarily on the 
shared information that a particular social body shares and uses to view 
the world. That said, at the very least, the concluding sketch of a 
computational theory was highly influenced by Lakota and Koestlerian 
philosophy alike. 
Humor 
As a starting point for discussion, one of the key components 
of heyoka behavior is humor and their employment thereof. As much 
of the heyoka's behavior is typically rendered humorous, investigating 
the logic of how humor generally works as informed by both Lakota 
traditional knowledge and the insights provided by Western 
philosophers is important in order to understand the relationships 
between the symbolic incorporations of the (rest of the) physical 
environment and the associations or relationships that are made 
between them. However, an initial discussion of previous investigation 
into the phenomenon of humor from the Western intellectual tradition 
is in order. 
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Figure 1. The Bissociative Shock (Koestler 1964: 35) 
Much has been written on the psychology of humor since 
Plato, and most renowned philosophers touched upon the topic and 
some point. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant notes that humor 
"belongs to originality of mind .. Humour, in a good sense, means the 
talent for being able to put oneself at will into a certain frame of mind 
in which everything is estimated on lines that go quite off the beaten 
track, (a topsy-turvy view of things,) and yet on lines that follow 
certain principles, rational in the case of such a mental temperament" 
(Kant 1928: 203). Furthering the thesis, Arthur Koestler notes that 
"Humour depends primarily on its surprise effect: the bisociative 
shock. To cause surprise the humorist must have a modicum of 
originality-the ability to break away from the stereotyped routines of 
thought" (Koestler 1967: 91). Koestler defines "bisociative" as the 
dual-association with "routine skills of thinking" and "the creative act" 
(Fig. 1). 
Koestler's model depicts "the perceiving of a situation or 
idea, L, in two self-conSistent but habitually incompatible frames of 
reference, MJ and M2 ••• The event L, in which the two intersect, is made 
to vibrate simultaneously on two different wavelengths, as it were. 
While this unusual situation lasts, L is not merely linked to one 
associate context, but bisociated with two" (35). Take, for instance, 
someone belching loudly during a moment of prayer at a Christian 
mass. The bisociative shock occurs when one context (the sanctity and 
silence of prayer) suddenly clashes with another (the general rudeness 
of eructation). In this case, however, few would find it very humorous. 
Humor, then, must contain a bisociative shock, but must be cognitively 
"coded positively" rather than negatively (for further discussion, see 
below). In this case, then, Koestler's discussion of the relationship 
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between creativity and humor would only be applicable if the belching 
individual erupted on purpose. Note Koestler's zigzagged illustration 
of the clash of the two frames. 
Humor, then, being "originality of mind" is the meeting place 
between two areas of thought. Pinker (1997), in reference to Koestler's 
observations, explains this quite well: 
Humor ... begins with a train of thought in one frame of reference that 
bumps up against an anomaly: an event or statement that makes no 
sense in the context of what has come before. The anomaly can be 
resolved by shifting to a different frame of reference, one in which the 
event does makes [sic] sense. And within that frame, someone's 
dignity has been downgraded (549). 
The "downgraded dignity" that Pinker refers to will be investigated 
below with respect to the Lakota clowns. What should be kept in mind, 
however, is the fact that this downgrading is one of the jUnctions or an 
example or type of humor. 
Kant defines laughter-the behavioral or external expression 
of humor-on the other hand as "an affection arising from a 
[cognitive1y based] strained expectation being suddenly reduced to 
nothing" (Kant 1928: 199). What makes a joke funny is an unexpected 
punch-line, slapstick humor is surprising, and linguistic humor is an 
employment of an inappropriate word/style for describing something. 
What makes humor emotional is the pleasant psychological state that 
ensues. In sum, humor is equal parts surprise and happiness. However, 
as mentioned above, sometimes what is intended to be humorous can 
be taken as an affront, in radical opposition to "happiness" (see below). 
Some attempts at humor are rendered inappropriate for two primary 
reasons: the joke is judged as poor taste both qualitatively (e.g. a dirty 
joke) and temporally (e.g. "not the right time for that"). 
At its core-but stripped of its emotional component-humor 
is a violation of our intuitions; what we judge to be funny results in the 
"beaten track" or "normalcy" of the medium (e.g. narrative, someone 
walking, etc.) being shocked off of the track suddenly (e.g. punch line, 
slipping on a banana peel)-with the extra feature of being "coded" 
positively by whomever witnesses the act or idea (see below for further 
discussion). Miller (2000) notes that "Comedy depends on showing 
how many ways something can go wrong-on violating expectations, 
not solving problems" (415). The term "intuitions" is preferable 
because "expectations" are quite specific and conclusive whereas 
intuition reflects an active process, rather than a representation. A 
simple joke, typically, is set up in a baiting fashion and the punch line 
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contains an element of surprise. Slapstick humor, on the other hand, is 
employed in a similar fashion; the "punch-line" in this case being a 
physical surprise of the body doing something typically uncomfortable 
(e.g. The Three Stooges). Veatch (1998) argues that humor is a 
"subjective moral violation" because it "violates a principle about 
which the perceiver believes, 'This is the way things should be"'. While 
is many (or even most) cases, this would is correct, the fact that many 
cases of, take say, political humor makes fun of those in high status. 
For those who dislike the target of the joke, the "moral principle" 
involved is not violated, but rather maintained. Nevertheless, the key 
component to Veatch's theory of humor is the fact that we have to be 
able to code such violations positively, or render the violation "alright" 
(Taylor 2004: 22). 
For such examples, we may consider them "representations" 
in order to get to the bottom of the present investigation. For all intents 
and purposes, "representation" may be used synonymously with "idea" 
or "occurrence"; it is a basic unit of analysis of information to which 
one may be exposed. Again, when we are confronted with a 
representation of something intended to be humorous (assuming we 
"get it"), sometimes the incoming information is decidedly unfunny or 
objectionable. Such is the case of the Lakota clowns. 
Heyoka 
Heyokas are the sacred clowns or contraries among the Sioux. 
These figures are, according to Lewis, "loosely organized [and] at least 
partly [a] secret society ... [and] by systematically breaking the customs 
and prohibitions of the community the contrary achieves a personal 
mysteriousness that translates into the magical and the sacred." (Lewis 
1992: 140) It must be noted that this "breaking the customs" and 
violating taboos are sanctioned only insofar as the individual that 
actually breaks the custom is indeed a heyoka, even though some, as 
revealed below, still find them objectionable. In other words, these 
institutionalized rebels, through their actual breaking of the rules, are 
enforcers and perpetuators of the holy-in order for the clowns to 
fulfill their role or obligations as heyoka, they break the rules. 
The heyoka, according to John Fire Lame Deer, "is an upside-
down, backward-forward, yes-and-no-man, a contrary wise ... Being a 
clown brings you honor, but also shame" (Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972: 
236). When a contrary is asked a question, he wili answer in opposites, 
they have been known to wear next to nothing in cold weather and wear 
far too much in hot weather, and they've been known to ride horses 
backwards in battles. Such is the life of a contrary. Traditionally, 
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heyokas tended to dress in shabby clothes; some were reported to 
simply wear burlap sacks with eyeholes cut out in them. Masks the 
clowns sometimes wore/wear have exaggerated phallic noses, and their 
actions are typically full of sexual innuendo and flat-out mock 
performance of sexual acts. They were known to have lived in tipis 
with the tarps or skins on the inside with the frame exposed to the 
elements. 
On the one hand, Feraca (1998) notes that "Lakotas do not 
consider clowns an especially amusing or comical group. In fact, their 
very presence constitutes a potential danger, particularly at religious 
functions" (50). Such "potential dangers" range from causing poor 
weather, a reversaUnullification of a particular rite, etc. On the other, 
as an insider, Lame Deer observes that "the no-account people and 
winos make fun of the heyokas, but the wise old people know that the 
clowns ... protect the people from lightning and storms and that his 
capers, which make people laugh, are holy. Laughter-that is 
something very sacred" (Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972: 237). Their 
receptions among the Sioux are obviously mixed, yet their impact on 
individuals and social gatherings alike, is unquestionable. On a 
practical level, the clown acts as a catalyst to bring psychological and 
emotional balance to others. Henry Crow Dog explains that 
White people depict us in their books and movies as stony-faced folks 
with the comers of our mouths turned down, always looking grim. But 
we are not like that. Among ourselves we joke and laugh. With all that 
suffering and poverty our people can survive only by laughing at 
misfortune. That's why we have the sacred clown, heyoka ... he makes 
us laugh through our tears (Crow Dog & Erdoes 1995: 60). 
Black Elk mused that "When people are already in despair, 
maybe the laughing face is better for them; and when they feel too good 
and are too sure of being safe, maybe the weeping face is better for 
them to see. And so I think that is what the heyoka ceremony is for" 
(Neihardt 2000: 145). This balance is maintained by the clowns 
themselves, who in turn act as an emotional equalizer for the people; 
through his "extreme" acts, the clown moderates the excesses of others. 
One formally becomes a contrary when he (or she, rarely) 
dreams of the Thunderbirds (Wakinyan) or one of their underlings' 
representations ranging from dragonflies, white animals such as horses, 
dogs, snowbirds, frogs, and hailstorms (Walker 1991: 10 1). According 
to Thomas Tyon, "the Wakinyan often command the man who dreams 
of them to do certain things" which are typically quite embarrassing for 
the initiate. If one fails to do whatever they are instructed to do by the 
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Thunderbirds (or lieutenants), "the Wakinyan will surely kill them" by 
lightning strike (155-156). In sum, the Thunderbirds will "gift" the 
dreamer with a scenario that he must act out in public-in some cases, 
it is claimed that the conditions and people that are in the dream are 
also revealed making the act quite specific in terms of timing. 
According to Lame Deer, "A heyoka, if he follows his dream 
to the letter, has to dress up as he saw himself in his vision". Such 
instructions in the dreams, according to written accounts, are to be 
carried out in everyday life. While there are specific behaviors a 
heyoka must fulfill, being a clown is more of a lifestyle, for lack of a 
better word; one does not become a clown only during specific times, 
but rather are perpetually in a state of behaving in opposites and 
making others laugh. In the case of the highly organized rites of the 
Sioux, the clowns typically cause mass disruption by chastising rite 
participants and the audience in their usual manner. However, in the 
clowns' efforts to bridge the sacred and quotidian, "sacred" and highly 
individualized rites are performed as almost daily prescriptions, rather 
than an elaborate ritual. For instance, Lame Deer himself, in 
accordance to his dream, became a winkte or cross-dresser by the name 
of "Alice Jitterbug" who performed as a rodeo clown. Though not 
what one would immediately assume to be a "religious act", provoking 
laughter in a large audience under the prescription of the Thunderbirds, 
is, however. There is, however, a specific clown ceremony (heyoka 
kaga) for inductees. 
There are two clear variations of the heyoka kaga. Holy 
Dance, an Oglala, describes the variations as a highly formalized rite 
which may be due to the initiate's being a woman. After the obligatory 
inipi (sweatlodge purification), eight heyokas enter a tipi to get dressed 
in their respective regalia, while the clowns conducting the ceremony 
remain in the initi (actual lodge). Two of the eight clowns leave the 
first tipi, only to walk a few yards to a second tipi, where they will 
remain singing for the rest of the ritual. More highly organized 
dancing, singing, and prayer occur, until a pot of boiling water with a 
dog in it is ready. Prior to this, the dog must be killed immediately to 
reflect the sudden nature of lightning (DeMallie 1984: 232). The 
initiate plunges her hands into the pot, without scalding, and pulls the 
dog's head out. Heyoka tapejuta, or "clown medicine" (Malvastrum 
coccineum), prevents the clowns from getting scalded. Malvastrum 
coccineum is commonly known as red false mallow or prairie mallow. 
It is a grey "moss root" (Buechel & Manhart 2002: 83). It is chewed up 
and spread over the hands and arms in order to tolerate the boiling 
water, although according to the Sioux, it is only functional on a true 
heyoka. Holy Dance states that if "anyone in the crowd belong[s] to 
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that [heyoka] organization, they will rush toward her taking the dog 
head, which is very hot." They all return to the first tipi, concluding the 
ceremony (Lewis 1992: 145). 
Some sources claim that the vision of the heyoka dictates how 
long one must serve as a clown, while others indicated there is a level 
of personal choice involved. Either way, a ceremony is held to 
"formalize" the heyoka's transition from being a clown to becoming 
either a different sort of practitioner or reintroduced to "normal" life. 
As in the heyoka kaga, a sacred dog is boiled and the clown ending his 
"term" plunges his hands into the boiling water and pulls the dog's 
head out, tossing it to someone who is not a heyoka. According to 
Lame Deer, the clown runs, "guided ... by the spirit, by what he has 
dreamed, to whom to give this dog's head. He will give it to a certain 
sick man or woman [who] quickly [throws] it to another man." Non-
clowns toss the head around, getting scalded, while the other clowns 
gather the rest of the dog meat with their bare hands. The meat then is 
distributed to the "poor and the sick. [The clown's] dreams told them 
whom to give it to. That's a good medicine" (Lame Deer & Erdoes 
1972: 245). This version is much less structured and formal than the 
initiation into "heyokism". 
The logic of performing the heyoka kaga and the rite which 
terminates one's service as a contrary is a perfect reflection of the 
heyoka's nature. One enters, formally through the rite, his or her 
"clownship" in order to serve the Wakinyan. When one's term is nearly 
complete, they perform (still as clowns) the heyoka kaga once again. 
Obviously, the opposite of ending one's service as a contrary would be 
beginning one's service, hence the near exactitude of rites-the only 
difference being the level of formalization. This may, however, simply 
be due to individual variation in ritual practice. 
Being contraries, the clowns must perform certain aspects of 
various ceremonies backwards, or simply act ridiculously during sacred 
rites. The actual heyoka ceremony itself illustrates the nature of these 
clowns. John Plant notes that, in conjunction with the contrariness of 
the heyoka, "Die Musik fUr die Zeremonie [ist] entweder dumpf oder 
unharmonisch. Man konnte sie als 'verkehrte Musik' bezeichnen." 
How is this "reverse" or anti-music possible? He observes that "Eine 
gedampfte Trommelmusik wurde auch erreict, indem man mit StOcken 
aif ein am Boden aufgespanntes Fell schlug" (Plant 1994: 95).1 
As the W akinyan govern the clowns, there are a number of 
common threads throughout the literature including a number of 
associations that are made between the clowns, the theme of 
opposites/dichotomies, the Thunderbirds, humor, shock, creativity, 
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procreation, and specific animals. The question begs: why are these 
associations made and/or observed? 
Non-Human Elements of the Environment 
As previously mentioned, dreaming of lightning is a sure sign 
of one's "assignment" of being a heyoka. Depictions of lightning look 
like a single bolt, which forks into two (sometimes feathered) branches 
(Fig. 2). Lame Deer notes that the forked lightning bolt represents the 
dualistic nature of the clowns, as the power of the Thunderbirds "is the 
power of the hot and the cold clashing way above the clouds ... 1t is 
good and bad" (Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972: 240). 
Figure 2. Wakinyan (Illustration 
Adapted from Lame Deer & Erdoes, 1972: 240). 
Clearly, the occurrence of lightning and thunder is startling, but we do 
not associate the nature of lightning to be humorous per se. The logic 
is the same, however, with the replacement of elation with fear. All 
illustrations of lightning are illustrated with forked ends, emphasizing 
both the dual nature of the clowns as well as their reception among 
non-clowns. Here, again, we have the shock or clash of opposites-as 
illustrated by both Koestler (Fig. 3) and the Lakota (Fig. 2)--{;oming 
from a single source. 
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Figure 3. Model of the Tragic vs. Comedic Experience 
(Koestler 1967: 34) 
Koestler compares the experience of witnessing a tragic 
presentation with that of a comedic presentation. The emotional 
buildup of the tragedy (and those that experience it) peaks smoothly 
and concludes by tapering. The comedic moment, however, is a clear 
bolt; the experience is explosive and concludes with reflexive laughter. 
Once again, this explosion is a result from an unexpected turn (Fig. 2). 
Another lieutenant or related entity of the Wakinyan is the 
common bam swallow (Hirundo rustica). As a means of 
morphological comparison, the forked tail of the swallow parallels 
quite well with the illustration of lightning. However, simple 
observation also reveals that the flight pattern of these small birds is as 
erratic and zigzagged as the lightning bolt. Particularly when they are 
feeding, swallows do not fly in a linear fashion, but take sudden, quick, 
and seemingly aimless turns, unlike most avian species. According to 
Lakota observations swallows make a significant presence before a 
thunderstorm (Brown 1992: 45). This relationship/observation is also 
established in Lakota cosmological stories. For instance, in George 
Sword's telling of the story "A Myth of the Lakotas as It Is Told in 
Their Winter Camps", a number of brothers are afraid to press forth on 
their journey as they approach a range of mountains with an emerging 
storm. A swallow informs them that he is the messenger of the 
Wakinyan (Walker 1983: 81). It should be noted that the bat actually 
seems not to be associated or directly related to the Wakinyan. The bat 
is an aide to Yata, a blind giant that lives in the mountains. However, it 
should be noted that Yata is described as "not wise and often does 
things foolishly" by Red Rabbit (Walker 1983). 
This reveals a clear relationship between both the form and 
logic of humor and the Thunderbirds and swallows. Miller discusses 
the "logic of proteanism" with his investigation of unpredictable 
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behavior as an evolutionary adaptation: "Predictability is punished by 
hostile animals capable of prediction. Instead of fleeing in a straight 
line, rabbits tend to zigzag erratically-a protean escape behavior that 
makes rabbits much harder to catch. Like the moth, the rabbit probably 
evolved special brain mechanisms to randomize its escape path" (Miller 
2000: 398). Compare this with Lame Deer's recollection of one 
contrary who was being chased by some "cowboys on horseback". He 
says that "they were trying to lasso him, but they never came close. He 
was running in front of them, and sometimes he would turn 
somersaults. Sometimes he would tum around and run backward, and 
when they got near him he'd tum around once more and get away." 
Lame Deer continues to note that the cowboys gave up, left, and the 
heyoka turned out to be "an old man in his seventies ... An old white-
haired grandfather, but the thunder-beings had given him the power to 
run fast."(Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972: 248) 
A heyoka is seen as an impersonator of a form of a 
"Supernatural" or "Mystery" in the pantheon of Lakota cosmology. 
According to one source, the Wakinyan appears occasionally as 
Heyoka, a "God" who is an "amiable giant." In one story, the 
Thunderbird appears as this giant upon the swallow fulfilling the role of 
being a clown. Once the swallow sees this, he is no longer required to 
impersonate the deity (Walker 1991: 318, 221). Reverend Eugene 
Buechel, a Jesuit who worked with and among the Lakota defined 
heyoka as "the name of a Dakota god called by some the anti-natural 
god. He is represented as a little old man with a cocked hat on his 
head, a bow and arrows in his hands and quiver on his back. In winter 
he goes naked, and in summer he wraps his buffalo robe around 
himself' (Buechel 1970: 274). No other practitioner is required to 
impersonate a "Mystery", yet the clowns are specifically required to 
carry out their orders as a "Heyoka impersonator", or they suffer the 
consequences. This, however, is not typical of only clowns, as "public 
displays of ritual [ or vision] were required before a man could control 
the powers that had been given him" (DeMallie 1985: 88). White 
animals in general represent a natural anomaly considering how rare 
albinism and white coloring occur-particularly on the Plains. If 
Heyoka is described as an "anti-natural god", the affiliation with 
"unnaturally" colored animals makes perfect sense. 
Here is another clear association between these relationships 
with that of creativity in all of its forms. Koestler has three criteria of 
the "humorist's technique" and the creative enterprise in general: 
originality, emphasis, and implicitness (Koestler 1967: 333). The 
relationship between humor and creativity should be quite clear; humor 
is hinged on novelty or sudden violations of intuition and creativity is 
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the progression from the extant to the novel. This is reflected in most 
trickster literature, and Lakota stories are no exception. 
In Walker's account of the Lakota creation story, "Inyan [the 
stone] has two offspring. The older was brought forth full-grown from 
an egg in an antinatural manner by Wakinyan. His name was Ksa and 
he was the God of wisdom but he become [sic] the imp of mischief and 
his name is Iktomi". The second offspring, interestingly enough, is Iya 
"who is utterly evil and the chief of all evil beings" (Walker 1991: 51). 
Iktomi the Spider-man is described as being "the size of an ordinary 
man. His body was big and round like a bug. His legs and arms were 
slim like a bug's" (1991: 101). Other accounts claim that "Spiders 
were made from the blood of ancient people who died in a great flood. 
Ikto can be powerless, a nobody, lower than a worm. But he can also 
be a creator, more cunning than humans ... He can transform himself. 
He is a mischief maker. He is good and bad at the same time-quick 
thinking, taking advantage of every opportunity" (Erdoes & Ortiz 1998: 
xv). Recall Miller's definition of "proteanism"-lktomi reflects 
unpredictability and shape shifting. 
Iktomi is attributed with creating language and giving names 
to people and animals as well as arrowheads and war clubs (Brown 
1992: 47; Walker 1991: 106). Old Horse recalls that "Iktomi is heyoka 
for he talks with the Thunderbird. He will not play his tricks on the 
heyoka" (1991: 129). Among the many Iktomi trickster tales, there are 
three main qualities that are fundamental to him and trickster figures in 
general: voracious sexual and nutritional hunger, and pulling pranks on 
others. Here, lktomi's sexual exploits (i.e. constantly trying to 
"create") relate quite nicely, once again, to the relationship between 
creativity and humor as illustrated by Koestler. Pranks require baiting 
others (much like a punch line) to behave in some way in order to trick 
them (violation of intuitions). Lewis Hyde notes: 
Trickster is a boundary-crosser. Every group has its edge, its sense of 
in and out, and trickster is always there ... We constantly distinguish-
right and wrong, sacred and profane, clean and dirty, male and female, 
young and old, living and dead-and in every case trickster will cross 
the line and confuse the distinction. Trickster is the creative idiot, 
therefore, the wise fool, the gray-haired baby, the cross-dresser, the 
speaker of sacred profanities (Hyde 1998: 7). 
Hyde also brings up an interesting fact which parallels both the role of 
the heyoka and the sacred clown himself: namely, the trickster 
transcends morality. 
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He notes, "When someone's sense of honorable behavior has 
left him unable to act, trickster will appear to suggest an amoral action, 
something right/wrong that will get life going again. Trickster is the 
mythic embodiment of ambiguity and ambivalence, doubleness and 
duplicity, contradiction of paradox" (1998: 7). It would not be 
unreasonable to see the "amorality" and the trickster's transcendence of 
the good/bad dichotomy contained within the illustration of lightning. 
Moreover, lktomi's fundamental conflict-being perpetually "hungry", 
yet being responsible for the creative experience-is clear within the 
Wakinyan model. Here, the oft-quoted statement of Black Elk offers 
even more significance: "when a vision comes from the thunder 
beings .. .it comes with terror like a thunder storm; but when the vision 
has passed, the world is greener and happier; for wherever the truth of 
vision comes upon the world, it is like a rain. The world, you see, is 
happier after the terror of the storm" (Neihardt 2000: 145). This is also 
reflected in Lakota thought as Iktomi is responsible for bringing death 
to the world in order to make room for more creation (Brown 1992: 
48). 
Anthropologist Victor Turner (1995) states that "nothing 
underlines regularity so well as absurdity or paradox ... nothing satisfies 
as much as extravagant or temporarily permitted illicit behavior" (176). 
In the liminal state, in which the clowns clearly are, he or she functions 
as a preserver of the rites and ceremonies through his absurd acts and 
interference. Turner states that "liminal entities ... are betwixt and 
between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, 
convention, and ceremonial" (1995: 99). Moreover, "if liminality is 
regarded as a time and place of withdrawal from normal modes of 
social action, it can be seen as potentially a period of scrutinization of 
central values and axioms of the culture in which it occurs" (1995: 
167). Obviously, the contraries are indeed in a state of "withdrawal 
from normal modes of social action", whereas the times spent 
"scrutinizing" is enacted in the form of outright dissidence. Here is 
where the fundamental contradictory nature of the clown reveals itself. 
The heyoka, being under the influence of the Wakinyan have 
clear associations with the pipe and what it represents. When used in a 
ceremonial manner, the pipe is meant to uphold and maintain the truth. 
Black Elk states that when "you are about to put this pipe to your 
mouth, you should tell us nothing but the truth. The pipe is wakan 
[sacred] and knows all things; you cannot fool it." He also states that 
the Wakinyan "guards the pipe." By extension, then, the clowns, 
through their opposite nature, reinforce and uphold truth by consciously 
doing and saying exactly the opposite. The connection between the 
Thunderbirds and Truth is also embedded in a statement made when 
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what one says is challenged or a promise is made: 
Wakinyan agli-wakinyan namahon" (Lame Deer & 
241).2 
"Na ecel lila 
Erdoes 1972: 
Lakota thought clearly reflects an observed relationship with 
the internal (mental) and external environments. While lightning may 
occur "out there" it also, in a sense, occurs within. The relationships 
between features of the internal (mental and social) environment such 
as wisdom, truth, and mischief and protean behavior are reflections of 
features of the external environment as seen in storms, swallows, 
spiders, and other anomalies. 
Toward a Computational Account of Humor 
There have been very impressive recent attempts to 
understand the computational (i.e. on a computer) recognition of 
particular humorous statements (Taylor 2004). One of the most 
remarkable things, however, about human processes of humor is that it 
is a cognitive reflex ("objective") but requires the constraints of the 
sense of humor (SoH) in order to trigger the reflex ("subjective"). How 
can we account for a universal, deep-rooted cognitive reflex and the 
individually differentiated, schematic/surface differences? One of the 
merits of the modular theory of mind is the fact that it bridges the age-
old divide between biology (universal) and learned information 
(individual). According to modularity theory, the mindlbrain can be 
divided conceptually into various functions or faculties. Fodor (1983) 
thus defines "faculty psychology" as the "view that many 
fundamentally different kinds of psychological mechanisms must be 
postulated in order to explain the facts of mental life" (1). In other 
words, there are a number of innate, cognitive mental mechanisms that 
are responsible for particular types of information (rather than all or 
many types of information) processing or domain-specific (Hirschfeld 
& Gelman 1994). The remaining discussion in this essay focuses 
specifically on mental functions, not the brain as a biological structure. 
Regardless, when discussing mental activity or faculties, we can 
assume safely, as does Chomsky, that all things mental "ultimately lead 
to the brain", hence the term "mind/brain" (Chomsky 1980: 5). 
Fodor (1998) renders a faculty to be modular if it has four 
distinct criteria: encapsulation, inaccessibility, domain specificity, and 
innateness (127-128). Encapsulation, or "informational encapsulation" 
is the idea that modules have hardwired information within them, 
which informs perception and that they cannot be altered by outside 
information (127). In other words, the limits of whether or not these 
"mental organs" can work in tandem is regulated by other features of 
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the mindlbrain rather than conscious effort. "Inaccessibility" refers to 
the idea that while incoming information cannot alter the state of or the 
information contained within the target module (encapsulation) itself, 
the target module cannot inform outside information-in other words, 
"it is supposed not to be available for the subject's voluntary report" 
(127). 
Clearly there is an innate component to humor and laughter 
(see Gervais & Wilson in press for a thorough evolutionary discussion 
of humor and laughter). Children learn to laugh and find things funny 
on their own; they do not need to be trained to experience humor (quite 
the opposite, actually). The fact that laughter is reflexive indicates that 
something is informing us that the incoming stimulus is funny, but it 
has to successfully pass through our "sense of humor" (Fig. 4). Some 
of us enjoy dark, visceral humor whereas others find such humor 
always inappropriate. There are many interesting developmental 
questions regarding the precise types or nature of a particular sense of 
humor, but such an investigation is beyond the scope of this essay. 
Nevertheless, whatever mechanism that causes laughter must be 
informed, somehow, by both the constraints of the sense of humor and 
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Figure 4. The Relationship 
between Learned and Innate Information 
Tooby and Cosmides investigate the main theoretical 
difference between behaviorist and nativist/innatist approaches to the 
mind. They distinguish between what they call the Standard Social 
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Science Model (SSSM) and the Integrated Causal Model (lCM). The 
SSSM is "The consensus view of the nature of social and cultural 
phenomena that has served for a century as the intellectual framework 
for the organization of psychology and the social sciences and the 
intellectual justification for their claims of autonomy from the rest of 
science" (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). Because of this century-long 
stagnation of development, "the central concept in psychology [has 
been] learning", rather than innateness or the interaction between 
nature and nurture. 
In other words, the assumption that most behavior is learned, 
rather than an expression of genetically endowed faculties. And such 
learning, according to the SSSM, must be "equipotential, content-free, 
content-independent, general-purpose, domain-general. .. these 
mechanisms [of learning] must be constructed in such a way that they 
can absorb any kind of cultural message or environmental input equally 
well" (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). The ICM, on the other hand, 
attempts to locate specific qualities of the mind, their function(s), and 
under what conditions are they optimal. Quite likely, one's sense (or 
frame) of humor is partially learned or culturally inherited, but the 
relationship to the biological basis of humor and the learned sense of 
humor-and the appropriate stimuli---ought to be clearer. 
While specific surface-features of humor-inducing information 
may be "culturally" specific (e.g.':horny spiders"), the laughing reflex 
is most certainly genetically determined. It seems that such a 
mechanism automatically distinguishes between vanetIes of 
representations; we do not laugh a just anything. The SoH, I argue, 
"checks" incoming information in the following grossly general 
categories: a) intuitive or extant and b) counterintuitive or novel (Fig. 
3). Consider the following examples: 
1) A man walked down the street and considered buying flowers for 
his wife. 
2) A flower walked down the street and considered buying humans for 
his wife. 
The first is perfectly normal in our society whereas the latter, as far 
as most can tell, is not. One does not need to be told/taught that 
flowers do not do such things, but one needs to learn the symbolic 
gesture of gifting a flower. The knowledge of the fact that people in 
our culture attribute the gifting of plants with colorful petals as some 
sign of affection is required to "get" the humor of the joke which is 
crafted from a reversal of the relationship between man and flowers. 
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One could conceivably find the idea of a flower walking down the 
street as humorous as well, but for other reasons (Purzycki 2006). This 
reversal constitutes Koestler's "bisociative shock" as two frames of 
reference clash in unexpected ways. However, it is a violation of 
intuitions because there is a breach of the ongoing process of accessing 
related material. "A flower walked down the street" may stimulate a 
number of expected outcomes, but the process of accessing all we 
know about flowers, walking, and streets entails branching out 
(intuiting) to particular features we associate with each of these. It is 
only the moment of "buying humans for his wife" does this access the 
appropriate association of flowers and the kind gesture of buying them 
for a loved one. The reversal is the "shock to the inferential system", 
and thusly produces laughter. 
Intuitive Novelty 
Code (+) Code (-) 
Figure 5. Skeletal Model of Coding 
Figure 5 is a skeletal model of how incoming information is coded 
computationally. The crucial component here is the "novelty" 
determination. The very nature of the novelty, however, determines 
what actually follows (e.g. stored better in the memory, triggering of 
laughter or disgust, etc.). Let us look at another example to illustrate 
the point: suppose someone were to tell you to "Go Foucault yourself'. 
Now, there are a number of ways one can take this, given the 
conditions provided by you, the reader. But keep in mind your mental 
reflexes. In order to fully "get the joke", a rudimentary understanding 
of who Foucault is (or those who claim some intellectual allegiance 
with him), post-modem is/claims to be, and what this sort of work 
consists of, etc. is imperative. However, if one does in fact know/think 
they know what post-modernism is and as a reflex, rendered the 
statement inappropriate or felt as though their personal intellectual 
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paradigm has been affronted, then "humorous" is not quite an accurate 
term to describe the experience. 
When we are confronted with something novel-we do not 
actively reflect on everything we've experienced in order to 
consciously determine whether or not something is new. Rather, we 
immediately react as though the stimulus is-and we are capable of 
acknowledging its novelty. This trigger explains why, for instance, a 
joke is no longer humorous once it has already been told; the novelty-
detection system renders the stimulus "extant". In the "post-modem" 
joke, you immediately knew whether or not you've heard the joke 
before (but it may have sounded like something you've heard before, 
which makes it funny), which is yet another interesting facet of the 
humorous experience; our deep-rooted reflexes become quite 
accustomed to repeated jokes. Old jokes lose their novelty after a 
telling or two as the joke becomes integrated into the "intuitive". 
Again, while it may be argued that it is ultimately subjective, 
there are decidedly objective components to humor, its use, and 
judgment as previously examined. Schematic or surface (learned) 
differences comprise the basis for judgment between individuals: what 
one finds funny, another may find intolerable and/or morally 
corrupt/objectionable. The primary components, as discussed above, 
are a humorous idea's novelty or violation of intuitions and the 
automatic coding of "positive". Statements judged intolerable arguably 
contain the same element, they are simply coded negatively (and 
elaborated with conscious judgments such as "inappropriate" or 
"immoral"). Again, the fact that we do not have to recall everything we 
have previously experienced to know whether something is 
novel/funny/unacceptable--it is an automatic judgment made by the 
SoH is an important feature. The detection device requires access to 
previously internalized information and experience. If a novelty 
triggers the jolt of humor and is coded positively, we laugh. Koestler 
notes that "Humor is the only domain of creative activity where a 
stimulus on a high level of complexity produces a massive and sharply 
defined response on the level of physiological reflexes" (31). Laughter 
arises as an automatic reflex of computing incoming stimuli as "funny". 
However, the immediate reaction requires some access to previously 
acquired information as well as the immediate identification of the 
stimulus as novel. 
It accesses the schematic information we accumulate, 
evaluates the data according to that previously acquired information 
and produces a reactionary judgment. It goes without saying that we 
rarely have to intellectually decide whether or not something is 
funny-it is a knee-jerk reaction. 
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Conclusion 
The key elements of humor-violation of intuitions, positive 
reactions, and the cultural stimulation required-provide enough to 
further develop a computational theory of humor. As the cross-
cultural, unified understanding of humor and its related phenomena 
such as creativity and novelty provide an important starting point, 
further elaboration of a computational account of humor is rendered 
easier. 
Footnotes 
1 The first part translates: "The music for the ceremony is either vague 
or unharmonic. One can characterize it as 'reverse music'." The 
second part translates: "A quiet drumming is attained, while they hit a 
skin [or drumless drumhead] spread out on the ground with sticks." 
2 This translates roughly as "Thus the winged, and as it really is, 
thunder comes back-Thunder hears me." This is more or less the 
English equivalent of "If I am lying, may God strike me down [with a 
bolt oflightning]". 
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